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Public Enemy Number One
The Poor
People of India
How
adivasis of Bastar are the target of the might of the Indian state
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All those killed by the police are
retrospectively termed Naxals. Public Interest Litigations have
been pending in the Supreme Court since 2007, asking for an
inquiry into killings, rapes and murders since 2005. Despite the
gravity and urgency of the situation, there has been no hearing
of such a case for over a year now, because a suitable
‘non-miscellaneous’ day has not been available. Not surprisingly
unlawful killings continue. |
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 An
operation is underway in Central India, but no one really knows what
it is. Variously described as a media myth, a comprehensive hearts
and minds strategy, and an all-out offensive by paramilitary forces
and the state forces along the borders of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, Operation Green Hunt has become a
shoebox of news clippings, police reports, public demonstrations and
armed encounters.
Depending on the
definition, Green Hunt either began in July 2009, September 2009 or
November 2009. Speaking off record, senior policemen confirmed that
the intensification of “search and comb” operations in Chhattisgarh
began as early as July last year. In September 2009 the press
reported on the progress of “Operation Green Hunt”: a massive 3 day
joint operation in which the central CoBRA force and state police
battled Naxal forces in Dantewada.
By November, the
press was regularly reporting on the planning and progress of Green
Hunt, prompting Home Minister, P. Chidambaram to term the operation
a “media invention.” Since then, the security apparatus has
scrupulously avoided all mention of Green Hunt. The week-long joint
operation, launched on December 25 2009 in Chhattisgarh and
Maharashtra for instance, was termed “Police Week.” The change in
nomenclature could be prompted by a realisation that the battle
between the state and the Naxals is unlikely to end anytime soon.
Speaking on background, police sources confirm that the conflict
shall take the form of “a prolonged, open-ended engagement” rather
than a short, fierce “operation.”
 There
is also little clarity on the extent of troop deployment, the
composition of the forces and the chain of command between central
paramilitary forces and the state police. Privately, sources in the
security apparatus admit that part of the confusion is by design
rather than by default to control the information available to Naxal
commanders. At present, the only information independently confirmed
by The Hindu relates to the Bastar Zone, a 40,000 square kilometre
area in Chhattisgarh that lies at heart of the battle. Sources state
that 7 additional battalions of central forces have been moved in
the area, bringing the strength of central forces in Bastar to a
total 20 battalions including troops from the CRPF, ITBP, BSF and
SSB. Taken alongside the 6,000 policemen deployed in Bastar, the
size of the total fighting force in the zone is about 20,000 troops.
“The first step
was to secure the roads. Ninety to ninety five per cent of
casualties of security forces occur on the roads.” said T.J.
Longkumer, Inspector General of Police, Bastar. “We have started
road security operations and indentified ambush prone areas.” It is
the next step that is proving controversial. “Forces shall actively
enter villages and nab naxal elements,” he added. Longkumer insists
that search operations are conducted only on the basis of concrete
intelligence and that all possible care is taken to minimise the
death of innocents. However, information emerging from villages in
the interior suggests otherwise.
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As the
battle-lines between the Naxals and the State shift with every
jungle encounter, adivasis across the zone of operations are
forced to assume a series of fluid identities contingent on the
force in power on a given day. In a police operation with no
clear name, timeline or goal, fought against a guerrilla force
that rarely wears uniforms, the adivasis are learning that each
side extracts a heavy price for supporting the other. |
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Figures provided
by the police suggest that a majority of police operations have
targeted “Sanghams” with 499 sangham members arrested in 2009 – up
from 214 in 2007. Sanghams refer to village level bodies installed
by the Naxals in areas under their control. Sangham members are
considered to be sympathetic to the Naxal cause, but it is important
to note that sangham members are not necessarily armed. While the
number of Naxals killed has also increased to 113 in 2009, as
compared to 66 in 2008, and the number of civilian deaths attributed
to Naxal violence has reduced from 143 in 2008 to 116 in 2009,
Chhattisgarh does not keep any record of civilians killed by the
security forces. Police sources cite this as validation of the
state’s efforts to minimise civilian casualties, but skeptics see
this as tautology where all those killed by the police are
retrospectively termed Naxals.
Two PILs pending
in the Supreme Court since 2007 have highlighted precisely this
problem, asking for an inquiry into killings, rapes and murders
since 2005. They have provided an initial list of over 500 people
killed, and subsequently pointed to discrepancies in the police
version and the FIRs filed. Initially, the bodies were not even
counted; now they are recorded as Naxalites killed in encounters.
The NHRC, which investigated a small sample of the killings on the
orders of the Court, noted with respect to the sangham members:
“These villagers were specifically targeted when Salwa Judum was on
the rise. The enquiry team has come across instances where some of
these villagers were even killed (no criminal cases were, however,
either reported or registered). Though the State has taken action
against SPOs in some cases for violations like murder and attempt to
murder, but these cases do not pertain to the violence let loose on
innocent villagers during operations against Naxalites.”
 Despite
the gravity and urgency of the situation, there has been no hearing
of this case for over a year now, because a suitable
‘non-miscellaneous’ day has not been available. Not surprisingly,
allegations of unlawful killing continue to dog the state
authorities. A writ petition filed in the Supreme Court last year
implicates the Chhattisgarh police in the deaths of a total of 12
villagers in Gachanpalli and Gompad villages as part of
“sanitisation” operations in September last year. The Chhattisgarh
police have assumed control over at least four of the 13
petitioners, and have actively prevented them from meeting their
lawyer. Witnesses to the Gompad incident have accused the police of
killing innocents at random.
On the other
side, on January 21 2010 local newspapers reported the killing of
two “police informers”, one a 16 to 18 year old tribal youth, in
Chhattisgarh’s Narayanpur district. Police sources cited in the
story attributed the killing to the Eastern Bastar Division
Committee of the Naxals. At a press conference in Raipur, Union Home
Minister P. Chidambaram stated that the two youth were killed as
they wanted to join the Indian Army.
As the
battle-lines between the Naxals and the State shift with every
jungle encounter, adivasis across the zone of operations are forced
to assume a series of fluid identities contingent on the force in
power on a given day.
In a police
operation with no clear name, timeline or goal, fought against a
guerrilla force that rarely wears uniforms, the adivasis are
learning that each side extracts a heavy price for supporting the
other.
10
February 2010
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